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Abstract
The paper analyzes the process of market selection of investment
strategies in an incomplete market of short-lived assets. In the model
under study, asset payoffs depend on exogenous random factors. Mar-
ket participants use dynamic investment strategies taking account
of available information about current and previous events. It is
shown that an investor allocating wealth across the assets accord-
ing to their conditional expected payoffs eventually accumulates total
market wealth, provided the investor’s strategy is asymptotically dis-
tinct from the portfolio rule suggested by the Capital Asset Pricing
Model. This assumption turns out to be essentially necessary for the
result.
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1 Introduction
It has long been argued that, in competitive environments, market pressures
would eventually select those traders who are better adapted to the prevailing
conditions. According to the standard paradigm of economic theory, agents
maximize preferences or utilities. From the evolutionary point of view, what
matters is not the utility level, but the chances of survival. The evolution-
ary principle leads to the consideration of the process of economic natural
selection among the market participants, or among the strategies of behavior
they adopt. This view has been put forward by Alchian (1950), Enke (1951),
Penrose (1952) and pursued by many others.
The purpose of the paper is to elaborate on an evolutionary approach
to the study of investment strategies in financial markets. This work com-
bines ideas from economic theory and finance. We examine the process of
market selection in the framework of incomplete markets with traders using
dynamic investment strategies. In the model under study, it is supposed
that each trader follows a portfolio rule specifying the allocation of wealth
across the available assets at any moment of time and for any history of
events. We retain the key feature of economic equilibrium models where a
market-clearing mechanism determines prices endogenously in every period.
However, we depart from individual utility maximization. Instead, we as-
sume that trading strategies are compared with each other in terms of their
abilities to survive under market selection, rather than in the conventional
terms of discounted values.
We consider a market with short-lived assets that live only one time period
but are identically reborn every next period. The assets are in positive
supply, and their payoffs depend on the realization of exogenous states of
the world described in terms of a homogeneous finite-state Markov chain.
Short sales are ruled out. The focus is on the long-run dynamics of the
distribution of wealth across the investors. Following Epstein and Zin (1989,
1991), the model prescribes reinvestment of total wealth and thus precludes
consumption. This assumption, in particular, avoids the trade-off between
the rate of consumption and the evolutionary fitness of the trading rule in a
market.
In the case where only a complete set of Arrow securities is traded, the
states of the world are independent and identically distributed, and all the
traders use only simple portfolio rules (independent of time and observa-
tions), our framework reduces to the model considered by Blume and Easley
(1992, Section 3). They have demonstrated the remarkable role of the port-
folio rule prescribing the investor to distribute wealth between the assets
according to the probability of the state in which the asset pays out—this
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portfolio rule is often referred to as “betting one’s beliefs.” Blume and Easley
(1992) show that if a trader uses this rule, whereas all the others use differ-
ent (simple) portfolio rules, then the trader will eventually accumulate total
market wealth. In other words, the investor will be a single survivor in the
market selection process.
Apparently, the first who stated the principle underlying the rule of “bet-
ting one’s beliefs” was Kelly (1956). He showed (in a different context) that
this principle leads to the maximization of the expected logarithm of the port-
folio growth rate. This idea gave rise to a large body of research—see, e.g.,
Breiman (1961), Thorp (1971), Algoet and Cover (1988), and Hakansson and
Ziemba (1995). A common feature of these papers is that they study single-
agent problems with exogenous prices. Blume and Easley (1992) considered
an equilibrium model with prices determined endogenously. Nonetheless, due
to the completeness of the market (and the special structure of Arrow securi-
ties), their result regarding the rule of “betting one’s beliefs” can be reduced
to the maximization of the expected logarithm of an appropriately defined
relative growth rate.
The Blume–Easley approach has been extended by Sandroni (2000) and
Blume and Easley (2001) to expected utility maximizing investors with gen-
eral utility functions. These papers focus, basically, on dynamically complete
markets. As regards to incomplete markets, Sandroni (2000) provides a ver-
sion of the result that traders maximizing the expected logarithm of the
growth rate eventually accumulate all wealth—Proposition 1 in Section 2 of
the paper cited. This proposition does not apply to the model studied in the
present paper (its assumptions do not necessarily hold in our context, and
its conclusions do not imply the results we obtain).
Incomplete markets with simple trading strategies and independent iden-
tically distributed states of the world have been considered in Evstigneev,
Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002) (see also Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001)
who examine the local dynamics of the market selection process, dealing,
however, with more general strategies). There is a significant distinction
between models of this type and the previous ones. Owing to market incom-
pleteness and the endogenous mechanism of price formation, the questions
studied in this, more general, framework cannot be reduced to the single-
agent maximization of growth rates. Usually, the performance of a strategy
in a market selection process cannot be determined only by the strategy
itself; it depends on the combination of all the strategies employed by the
whole group of investors (this combination determines the endogenous asset
prices). The main finding in the last two papers is that investors distributing
their wealth according to the expected relative payoffs dominate the market.
The present paper continues the study conducted in Evstigneev, Hens,
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and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002). Our goal is to remove two simplifying assump-
tions that substantially reduce the scope of the models under study. Firstly,
we consider general, rather than simple, investment strategies. Secondly,
we abandon the assumptions of independence and identical distribution of
the random variables describing the states of the world and assume instead
that the sequence of these random variables is a homogeneous discrete-time
Markov process.
This more general set of assumptions results in a considerably enlarged
scope of the theory at hand, with enhanced realism and thus potential ap-
plicability of the results. In a financial investment setting, the state of the
world is a description of a large and complex set of variables characterizing
investors’ information, including, among many others, business cycle indica-
tors, central bank policy variables, various firm-level indicators and consumer
indices. The complexity underlying the evolution of so many relevant state
variables could not possibly be captured by a random process with indepen-
dent and identically distributed values. Some serial dependence, at least of
a Markov nature, must be postulated.
Furthermore, restricting consideration to simple investment strategies
amounts to asking each trader to commit to one and the same constant strat-
egy for the entire duration of the process, as if the agent had no access to any
relevant information throughout. This is hardly compatible with the real-life
behavior of investors, who typically react with considerable frequency to a
whole array of economic indices. Consequently, it seems imperative to model
investors’ behavior as reflecting unfolding events and disclosed information.1
To outline our main result, let us denote by λ∗ the portfolio rule that
requires a trader to allocate wealth across the assets in accordance with
their relative conditional expected payoffs. (In the Markov rather than i.i.d.
setting, we have to deal with conditional, rather than unconditional, expec-
tations.) Our main result is that, in any—complete or incomplete—market
for short-lived assets, a trader following the rule λ∗ eventually accumulates
total market wealth, provided the trader’s strategy λ∗ is asymptotically dis-
tinct from the CAPM rule. The latter prescribes investing into the market
portfolio.2 A trader using the CAPM rule keeps a constant fraction of market
1While our setting is formally not game-theoretic since agents are not payoff-
maximizing, an instructive partial analogy exists between the two concepts of strategy
described here and those in standard dynamic games. Simple and general strategies in our
evolutionary setting correspond, respectively, to the notions of open-loop and closed-loop
(with or without history-dependence) strategies in dynamic games.
2This investment rule is suggested by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and
Tobin’s mutual fund theorem—see, e.g., Magill and Quinzii (1996, Theorem 17.3 and
Proposition 16.15).
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wealth. Thus the trader can neither accumulate total market wealth nor be
driven out of the market. Investing into the market portfolio means mimick-
ing the“average” portfolio (therefore the CAPM strategy does not, typically,
belong to the class of simple strategies).
We prove that the λ∗-trader accumulates total market wealth at exponen-
tial rate if λ∗ is bounded away from the CAPM rule for “sufficiently many”
time periods. More precisely, we impose the following condition: there exists
a random number κ > 0 such that, almost surely, the distance between λ∗
and the CAPM rule is greater than κ in nt periods during every time-horizon
of length t, where lim inft→∞ nt/t > 0. Remarkably, this requirement turns
out to be not only sufficient but also necessary for the λ∗-trader to be a single
survivor in the market selection process, accumulating wealth at exponential
rate (see Theorem 2 in Section 3). The need for such a requirement arises
here due to the added complexity of strategic behavior. To the best of our
knowledge, the above result has no counterparts in the related literature.
Although our analysis is complete within the present framework, there
are certainly many desirable extensions of the model. One can mention,
for instance, long-lived assets, changes in the market structure, endogenous
asset supply, and variations of the investment-consumption ratio. These
generalizations are left to future research.
For recent studies on evolutionary finance dealing with different (albeit re-
lated) models and questions see Brock and Hommes (1998), Brock, Hommes,
and Wagener (2001), Sandroni (2000), Blume and Easley (2001) and refer-
ences therein.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The
main results are presented in Section 3. All the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Model
Let S be a finite set and st, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., a homogeneous Markov chain with
transition function p(σ|s), specifying the conditional probabilities P{st+1 =
σ| st = s}. The random variable st describes the “state of the world” at time
t. We consider a market with K assets. Their life cycle is one time period,
but they are identically reborn every next period. The total amount of each
asset k in the market is a positive constant Vk > 0, exogenously given in the
model. One unit of asset k issued at time t yields a payoff Ak(st+1, st) ≥ 0
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at time t+ 1. We assume
K∑
k=1
Ak(σ, s) > 0 (1)
for all σ, s ∈ S.
There are I investors (traders) i = 1, ..., I acting in the market. Every
investor i at each time t = 0, 1, 2, ... selects a portfolio
hit = (h
i
1,t, ..., h
i
K,t),
where hik,t is the number of units of asset k in the portfolio h
i
t. Generally, h
i
t
depends on the history st = (s0, ..., st) of the process st up to time t:
hit = h
i
t(s
t).
We will often omit the argument st when this does not lead to ambiguity.
As is explained below, this model allows portfolios to depend on past and
current market prices. We will assume that, at each time t ≥ 1 and in every
random situation st, the asset market clears:
I∑
i=1
hik,t(s
t) = Vk. (2)
According to this equality, demand for each asset k (the sum on the left-hand
side of (2)) is equal to its supply, Vk.
If investor i possesses a portfolio hit = (h
i
k,t) at time t ≥ 0, then her wealth
wit+1 at time t+ 1 can be expressed as
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)h
i
k,t.
For every i, a strictly positive number wi0 is given—the initial wealth of
investor i. In view of (2), we have
I∑
i=1
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)Vk, t ≥ 0. (3)
The variable
wt =
I∑
i=1
wit,
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specifies aggregate market wealth at time t ≥ 0.
It is assumed that every trader i selects a portfolio by using the follow-
ing procedure. The trader chooses an investment strategy—a sequence of
functions
λit = (λ
i
1,t, ..., λ
i
K,t), λ
i
t = λ
i
t(s
t), t ≥ 0, (4)
such that
λik,t > 0,
K∑
k=1
λik,t = 1, (5)
and assigns the share λik,t of the budget w
i
t for purchasing asset k at time t.
If every investor i has chosen a strategy (λik,t), the equation
ρk,t =
1
Vk
I∑
i=1
λik,tw
i
t (6)
determines the market clearing price ρk,t = ρk,t(s
t) of asset k at any time
t ≥ 0. The portfolio hit of investor i can be expressed by the formula
hik,t =
λik,tw
i
t
ρk,t
, k = 1, 2, ..., K, t ≥ 0.
From the last and the previous equations, we find
hik,t = Vk
λik,tw
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,tw
j
t
. (7)
This leads to the following formula expressing the wealth wit+1 of investors
i = 1, 2, ..., I at time t+ 1 through their wealth at time t:
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st+1, st)Vk
λik,tw
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,tw
j
t
. (8)
Since wi0 > 0, we obtain by way of induction that w
i
t > 0 for each t (see (1)
and (5)). From this we conclude that the evolution of the relative market
shares of the investors,
rit =
wit
wt
,
is governed by the equations
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
λik,t r
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t r
j
t
, i = 1, ..., I, (9)
7
where
Rk(st+1, st) =
Ak(st+1, st)Vk∑K
m=1Am(st+1, st)Vm
.
The numbers Rk(st+1, st) characterize the relative (normalized) payoffs of
the assets k = 1, 2, ..., K. We have Rk(st+1, st) ≥ 0 and
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st) = 1. (10)
The above notion of an investment strategy includes, in particular, port-
folio rules described in terms of traders’ demand functions. Suppose investor
i chooses her budget share λik,t as a function Λ
i
k,t(s
t, ρt, w
i
t) of the current and
past observations st, the vector ρt = (ρk,t) of the prevailing market prices and
wealth wit. In other words, suppose Λ
i
k,t(s
t, ρt, w
i
t) is the demand function of
investor i. Then the equation determining the equilibrium (market clearing)
price vector ρt takes on the form
ρk,t =
1
Vk
I∑
i=1
Λik,t(s
t, ρt, w
i
t)w
i
t.
Assuming an equilibrium is realized and solving the above equation, we ex-
press ρt as a function of s
t and w1t , ..., w
I
t . Since w
i
t = w
i
t(s
t), we obtain
that ρt and hence λ
i
k,t are functions of s
t, which agrees with our notion of a
strategy.
The main focus of this work is on the analysis of the evolution of the
relative market shares rit depending on the choice of the strategies λ
i
t, i =
1, 2, ..., I. We are interested primarily in those strategies that allow an in-
vestor to survive, i.e., to keep a positive relative market share in the limit,
and, moreover, that allow the investor to dominate the market, i.e., to ac-
cumulate in the limit all market wealth. A central role is played by the
following notion. We say that an investor i (or the strategy λi = (λik,t)) is a
single survivor in the selection process (9) if
lim rit = 1 (11)
almost surely (a.s.). Condition (11) implies lim rjt = 0 a.s. for all j 6= i,
which means that, in the limit, investor i accumulates all market wealth. If
the sequence rit involved in (11) converges to 1 at an exponential rate, we
shall say that the strategy λi dominates the others exponentially.
It is an important problem to identify those strategies which enable an
investor using them to become a single survivor. Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´
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(2001) and Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2002) have analyzed this
problem within two different settings: local and global, respectively. The
latter paper deals with a special case of the model in which
(i) the random variables st are independent and identically distributed;
(ii) the functions Ak (and hence Rk) depend only on st+1;
(iii) Vk = 1;
(iv) the expected values ERk(st) are strictly positive;
(v) the functions R1(s), ..., RK(s) are linearly independent (the absence
of redundant assets).
The analysis in the paper is restricted to the consideration of only simple
strategies λi = (λik,t), i.e., those for which the budget shares λ
i
k,t(s
t) do not
depend on t and st. For that model, the following result has been obtained
(Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ 2002, Theorem 3.1). If one of the
investors i = 1, ..., I, say i = 1, uses the simple strategy λ∗ = (λ∗k) defined by
λ∗k = ERk(st) (12)
while all the other investors i 6= 1 use different simple strategies λi 6= λ∗, then
investor 1 is a single survivor in the market selection process (9). This result
generalizes that of Blume and Easley (1992), dealing with the case of Arrow
securities (S = {1, 2, ..., K}, Ak(s) = 0 if s 6= k and Ak(s) = 1 if s = k).
Furthermore, the strategy (12) defined in terms of the expected payoffs may
be regarded as a development of the Kelly rule of “betting one’s beliefs”
(Kelly 1956). Originally designed in connection with gambling problems, this
rule has been successfully employed in portfolio theory (Thorp 1971, Aurell,
Baviera, Hammarlid, Serva, and Vulpiani 2000).
In this work, we intend to obtain versions of the above result applicable
to the more general model we have described in the present section. What is
most essential in this generalization is that we are going to leave the frame-
work of simple strategies and allow the investors to employ strategies using
information about the history of the process st—see the definition in (4) and
(5). In this context, we can define a direct analog of the strategy λ∗ given
by (12). As it turns out, we cannot, generally, guarantee λ∗ to be a single
survivor. Nevertheless, we show that this conclusion does obtain under a nat-
ural sufficient condition, having a clear economic meaning. We also provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for an investor using the strategy λ∗ to
be a single survivor dominating the others exponentially. Precise statements
of the results are given in the next section.
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3 Results
Consider the random dynamical system (9) describing the evolution of the
relative market shares rit(s
t) of the investors i = 1, 2, ..., I. Note that if
rt = (r
i
t) is a strictly positive vector, then, as is easily seen from (9), (10) and
(5), rt+1 is a strictly positive vector as well. Thus rt = rt(s
t) is a random
process with values in the relative interior ∆I+ of the unit simplex
∆I = {x = (x1, ..., xI) ∈ RI : xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1}.
The initial state r0 = (r
1
0, ..., r
I
0) ∈ ∆I+, from which this process starts, is
fixed (ri0 = w
i
0/
∑
wj0).
We will analyze the above random dynamical system under the following
assumptions.
(A.1) The functions
R∗k(s) :=
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s)Rk(σ, s), k = 1, 2, ..., K, (13)
take on strictly positive values for each s ∈ S.
(A.2) For every s ∈ S, the functions R1(·, s), ..., RK(·, s) restricted to the
set
Π(s) = {σ ∈ S : p(σ|s) > 0}
are linearly independent.
According to (A.1), the conditional expectation
R∗k(s) = E[Rk(st+1, st) | st = s] (14)
of the relative payoff Rk(st+1, st) of every asset k given st = s is strictly
positive at each state s. Assumption (A.2) means the absence of condition-
ally redundant assets. The term “conditionally” refers to the fact that the
functions Rk(·, s), k = 1, ..., K, are linearly independent on the set Π(s)—the
support of the conditional distribution p(σ|s).
In what follows, we will restrict attention to those investment strategies
λ = (λk,t) that satisfy the following additional assumption.
(B) The coordinates λk,t(s
t) of the vectors λt(s
t) are bounded away from
zero by a strictly positive non-random constant ρ (that might depend on the
strategy λ, but not on k, t and st).
In (5), we included in the definition of a strategy the condition λk,t > 0
(such strategies are sometimes termed completely mixed). Assumption (B)
contains the additional requirement of uniform strict positivity of λk,t.
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A key role in our analysis will be played by the strategy λ∗ = (λ∗k,t(st))
defined according to the formula
λ∗k,t(st) = R
∗
k(st), (15)
where R∗k(s) is the conditional expectation of Rk(st+1, st) given st = s (see
(13) and (14)). This is the direct analog of the strategy of “betting one’s
beliefs”, which takes on, in the case of independent identically distributed
variables st, the form (12). Note that λ
∗
k(st) = λ
∗
k,t(st) does not explicitly
depend on t, and, furthermore, λ∗k(st) is a function of only the current state
st of the process (st), rather than the whole history s
t of it. This implies,
by virtue of (A.1) and in view of the finiteness of S, that the strategy λ∗
satisfies condition (B).
To proceed further, we need to describe a recursive method of constructing
strategies based on (Markovian) decision rules. Suppose one of the traders,
say 1, has a privilege of making her investment decision at time t with full
information about the current market structure rt and the actions λ
2
t (s
t),
λ3t (s
t), ..., λIt (s
t) that have just been undertaken by all the other traders
2, 3, ..., I. Formally, the decision of investor 1 is specified by a function
ft(r, l
2, ..., lI), r ∈ ∆I+, lj ∈ ∆K+ (j = 2, 3, ..., K)
taking values in ∆K+ . Suppose such functions—decision rules—are given for
all t = 0, 1, 2, .... Furthermore, suppose investors 2, ..., I have chosen some
strategies λ2t , ..., λ
I
t (t = 0, 1, 2, ...). Then we can construct a strategy λ
1
t (s
t),
t = 0, 1, ..., of investor 1 by using the formula
λ1t (s
t) = ft(rt, λ
2
t , ..., λ
I
t ), (16)
where rt = rt(s
t) and λjt = λ
j
t(s
t), j = 2, ..., I.
Let us consider a particular decision rule f = (f1, ..., fK) (which does not
explicitly depend on t) defined by
f(r, l2, ..., lI) =
I∑
j=2
rj
1− r1 l
j. (17)
Here r = (r1, ..., rI) ∈ ∆I+, lj = (lj1, ..., ljK) ∈ ∆K+ , and so the vector f =
(f1, ..., fK) belongs to ∆
K
+ . Note that the vector f is a convex combination of
the vectors l2, ..., lI with weights rj(1−r1)−1. This implies, in particular, the
following: if the coordinates ljk of the vectors l
j are bounded away from 0 by
a constant ρ > 0, then the coordinates fk of f are bounded away from 0 by
the same constant. Consequently, if the strategies λ2t ,...,λ
I
t satisfy condition
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(B), the strategy (16) satisfies condition (B) as well. In what follows, we will
use the notation f = (fk) for the specific decision rule described in (17).
The decision rule (17) has a number of remarkable properties. First of
all, observe the following. Suppose investor 1 employs the strategy λ1t (s
t)
defined by (16) in terms of the decision rule (17). Then we have
λ1k,t =
I∑
j=1
λjk,t r
j
t , (18)
which, in view of (9), yields
r1t+1 = r
1
t .
Thus, if investor 1 uses the strategy generated by the decision rule (17), then,
regardless of what strategies are used by the others, the relative market share
of this investor remains constant over time. This observation leads to the
following conclusion. If one of the traders 2, ..., I uses the strategy λ∗, she
cannot be a single survivor, as long as trader 1 uses the strategy (16), (17)
and, consequently, keeps a constant positive market share r1t = r
1
0 for all t.
Further, we can see that the portfolio of investor 1, who uses the strategy
λ1t defined in terms of the decision rule (17), is given by
h1k,t = Vk
λ1k,tw
1
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,tw
j
t
= Vk
λ1k,t r
1
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
k,t r
j
t
= Vkr
1
t ,
for all k = 1, 2, ..., K (see (7) and (18)). Thus the vector h1t = (h
1
1,t, ..., h
1
K,t)
turns out to be proportional to the market portfolio, i.e., the vector
(V1, ..., Vk),
whose components indicate the amounts of assets k = 1, 2, ..., K traded at
the market. According to the well-known Tobin mutual fund theorem (Magill
and Quinzii 1996, Proposition 16.15), portfolios having this structure result
from the mean-variance optimization in the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Therefore it is natural to term the decision rule (17) the CAPM
decision rule and the strategy generated by it the CAPM strategy. The
CAPM decision rule plays a key role in the formulation of the main results
below.
The notions we have just described pertain to investor 1. We can intro-
duce analogous notions for any m ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}. To this end, consider the
vector function
fm(r, l1, ..., lm−1, lm, ..., lI) =
∑
j 6=m
rj
1− rm l
j
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of r = (r1, ..., rI) ∈ ∆I+ and lj = (lj1, ..., ljK) ∈ ∆K+ . This function specifies
the CAPM decision rule for trader m. Given strategies λjt(s
t) of all the
other traders j ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}\{m}, the CAPM strategy of m is defined by
λmt = f
m(rt, λ
1
t , ..., λ
m−1
t , λ
m+1
t , ..., λ
I
t ). Those properties we discussed for
m = 1, extend to an arbitrary m.
In Theorem 1 below, we describe a condition sufficient for the strategy
(15) to be a single survivor. We consider the dynamical system (9), assuming
that the investors i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} use some strategies λi = (λit) satisfying
requirement (B). We define
ζt = (ζ1,t, ..., ζK,t) = f(rt, λ
2
t , ..., λ
I
t ),
where f is the CAPM decision rule (17). The symbol | · | denotes the sum of
the absolute values of the coordinates of a finite-dimensional vector.
Theorem 1 Let investor 1 use the strategy λ1 = λ∗ defined by (15). Let the
following condition be fulfilled:
(C) With probability 1, we have
lim inf
t→∞
|λ∗(st)− ζt| > 0. (19)
Then investor 1 is a single survivor, and, moreover,
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
ln
r1t
1− r1t
> 0 (20)
almost surely.
Property (20) means that the relative market share of investor 1 tends
to one at an exponential rate, whereas the relative market shares of all the
other investors vanish at such rates, and so the strategy λ∗ dominates the
others exponentially.
Condition (C) can be restated as follows: there exists a strictly positive
random variable κ such that, almost surely,
|λ∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ (21)
for all t large enough. The last inequality requires that the actions λ∗(st)
prescribed by the strategy λ∗ should differ by not less than κ > 0 from the
actions
ζt(s
t) = (ζ1,t(s
t), ..., ζK,t(s
t)), ζk,t(s
t) =
I∑
j=2
rjt (s
t)
1− r1t (st)
λjk,t(s
t),
13
prescribed by the CAPM decision rule. Here, we do not assume that there
is at least one investor who indeed employs the CAPM rule; we need it only
as an indicator, a proper deviation of which from λ∗ guarantees λ∗ to be a
single survivor.
In concrete instances, it might not be easy to verify condition (C) directly.
Therefore we provide another hypothesis, (C.1), which is stronger than (C)
but can conveniently be checked in various examples.
(C.1) There exists a strictly positive random variable κ such that, with
probability 1, the distance between the vector λ∗(st) ∈ RK and the convex hull
of the vectors λ2t (s
t), ..., λIt (s
t) ∈ RK is not less than κ for all t large enough.
Clearly (C.1) implies (C) because ζt = f(rt, λ
2
t , ..., λ
I
t ) is a convex combi-
nation of λ2t , ..., λ
I
t .
Condition (C), which is sufficient for investor 1 to be a single survivor,
turns out to be close to a necessary one. The theorem below provides a
version of hypothesis (C) that is necessary and sufficient for the conclusion
of Theorem 1 to hold.
Theorem 2 Investor 1 using the strategy (15) is a single survivor in the
market selection process, and, moreover, dominates the others exponentially,
if and only if the following condition is fulfilled:
(C.2) There exists a random variable κ > 0 such that
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
#
{
t ∈ {0, ..., T} : |λ∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ
}
> 0 (22)
with probability 1.
The symbol # in the above formula stands for the number of elements in
a finite set.
Observe that (C.2) follows from (C). Indeed, (C) is equivalent to the
existence of a random variable κ for which, almost surely, inequality (21) is
fulfilled for all t large enough. In this case, the limit in (22) is equal to 1. The
limit in (22) may be thought of as a density (in the set of natural numbers)
of those natural numbers t for which inequality (21) holds. Hypothesis (C.2)
only requires this density to be strictly positive, whereas (C) says that (21)
should hold from some t on.
Let us return to Theorem 1. From this theorem, it follows immediately
that if the relation
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
ln
r1t
1− r1t
≤ 0 (23)
holds with positive probability, then, with positive probability, there exists
a (random) sequence tk such that
|λ∗(stk)− ζtk(stk)| → 0. (24)
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Can we make a stronger statement about convergence in (24) if we strengthen
(23) appropriately? A result along these lines is provided by the next theo-
rem.
Theorem 3 Let the following condition be satisfied:
(D.1) There exists a random variable 0 < γ < 1 such that E ln γ > −∞ and
r1t < 1− γ
a.s. for all t.
Then we have
|λ∗(st)− ζt| → 0 a.s.
We will actually prove Theorem 3 under a weaker assumption:
(D.2) The expectations
E[ln(1− r1t )]
do not converge to −∞.
Clearly (D.1) is stronger than both (D.2) and (23), but (D.2) does not
necessarily imply (23). Condition (D.1) holds, for example, if one of the
investors i = 2, ..., I uses the CAPM strategy (and so her relative market
share remains constant). Then, as Theorem 3 asserts, the difference between
the budget shares of investor 1 prescribed by the strategy λ∗ and the budget
shares prescribed by the CAPM decision rule converges a.s. to zero.
Appendix
A.1 Proofs of the Main Results
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By using (9), we write
1− r1t+1
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2 r
i
t+1
1− r1t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
(1− r1t )−1
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t
qk,t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
ζk,t
qk,t
,
where
qk,t =
I∑
m=1
λmk r
m
t = λ
1
kr
1
t + (1− r1t )
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t
1− r1t
= λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t ).
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Consequently,
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
ζk,t(1− r1t )
λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t )
, (25)
and
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1, st)
λ1kr
1
t
λ1kr
1
t + ζk,t(1− r1t )
. (26)
For each t = 1, 2, ..., consider the random variable
Dt = ln
r1t (r
1
t−1)
−1
(1− r1t )(1− r1t−1)−1
.
We have
D1 + ...+DT = ln
r1T
(1− r1T )
− ln r
1
0
(1− r10)
, (27)
Therefore, (20) holds if and only if
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
(D1 + ...+DT ) > 0 a.s.
By virtue of assumption (B), for every set of strategies (λik,t), i = 1, ..., I,
we consider, there exists a constant H such that (mini,k λ
i
k)
−1 ≤ H. For this
H, we have
H−1 ≤ r
i
t+1
rit
≤ H, i = 1, ..., I.
This implies
H−1 ≤ 1− r
1
t+1
1− r1t
≤ H
because 1 − r1t =
∑I
m=2 r
m
t . Consequently, the random variables Dt are
uniformly bounded.
We have the following identity
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
[Dt − E(Dt|st−1)].
Since the random variables Dt are uniformly bounded, we can apply to the
process of martingale differences Bt := Dt − E(Dt|st−1) the strong law of
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large numbers (Hall and Heyde 1980, Theorem 2.19), which yields T−1(B1
+ ... +BT )→ 0 with probability 1. Thus, we have
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1), (28)
and so (20) is equivalent to
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) > 0 a.s. (29)
By using (25), (26), we write
E[Dt|st−1] = E[ln r
1
t (r
1
t−1)
−1
(1− r1t )(1− r1t−1)−1
|st−1]
=
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|st−1) ln
∑
k
Rk(σ, st−1)
λ1k,t−1
λ1k,t−1r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1(1− r1t−1)∑
k
Rk(σ, st−1)
ζk,t−1
λ1k,t−1r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1(1− r1t−1)
, (30)
where
ζk,t−1 = ζk,t−1(st−1) =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k,t−1r
i
t−1
1− r1t−1
, (31)
λik,t−1 = λ
i
k,t−1(s
t−1), rit−1 = r
i
t−1(s
t−1), (32)
λ1k,t−1 = λ
1
k,t−1(st−1) = R
∗
k(st−1).
Let us use Lemma 1 (see Section A.2 below) to estimate the expression
in (30). In view of this lemma, we have
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ δρ(|R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|), (33)
where ρ is the strictly positive constant bounding away from zero the coordi-
nates of λit. Denote by N(T ) = N(T, s
T ) the set of those t ∈ [0, T ] for which
|R∗(st)− ζt(st)| ≥ κ. We have
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
δρ(|R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|)
≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
δρ(|R∗(st)− ζt(st)|) ≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
∑
t∈N(T−1)
δρ(|R∗(st)− ζt(st)|)
≥ δρ(κ) · lim inf
T→∞
1
T
#{N(T − 1)} > 0,
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where the last inequality follows from (C.2). Thus we have established (29),
which is equivalent to (20).
Now, suppose that (20), and hence (29), hold. By virtue of Lemma 1, we
find
E(Dt|st−1) ≤ Lρ · |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|,
and so (29) yields
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
dt > 0 a.s., (34)
where dt = |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)|.
Denote by κ¯ the strictly positive random variable which is equal a.s. to
the lim inf in (34) and set κ = κ¯/2. We claim that
lim inf
1
T
#
{
t ∈ {1, ..., T} : dt ≥ κ
}
> 0, (35)
which is equivalent to (C.2). Indeed, suppose the contrary. Then there is a
sequence Tk such that
1
Tk
#
{
t ∈ {1, ..., Tk} : dt ≥ κ
}→ 0. (36)
For each k denote by Mk (resp. Nk) the set of those t ∈ {1, Tk} for which
dt ≥ κ (resp. dt < κ). Then we have
1
Tk
Tk∑
t=1
dt =
1
Tk
∑
t∈Mk
dt +
1
Tk
∑
t∈Nk
dt ≤ 2 · 1
Tk
#(Mk) + κ (37)
because dt ≤ 2. According to (36), (Tk)−1 ·#(Mk)→ 0. Consequently,
lim inf
1
Tk
Tk∑
t=1
dt ≤ κ < κ¯,
which contradicts the definition of κ¯. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider the nonnegative random variables vt =
δρ(|R∗(st−1) − ζt−1(st−1)|). By using (33), we write Evt ≤ E[E(Dt|st−1)] =
EDt, which yields, in view of (27),
T∑
t=1
Evt ≤ E ln r
1
1− r1T
+ C ≤ −E ln(1− r1T ) + C,
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where C is some constant. According to (D.1), the expectations−E ln(1−r1T )
do not converge to +∞. Therefore the non-negative sums Ev1 + ...+ EvT
are bounded by a constant C1. Consequently,
E lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
vt = E lim
T→∞
inf
T∑
t=0
vt ≤ lim inf
T∑
t=0
Evt ≤ C1
by virtue of the Fatou lemma. Thus, we obtain
∑∞
t=0 vt < ∞ a.s., hence
vt → 0 a.s., and so |R∗(st−1)− ζt−1(st−1)| → 0 a.s. 
A.2 An Auxiliary Result
Let S be a finite set, and, for each s ∈ S, let p(σ|s) (σ ∈ S) be a probability
distribution on S:
p(σ|s) ≥ 0,
∑
σ
p(σ|s) = 1.
For every σ ∈ S, let R(σ, s) = (R1(σ, s), ..., Rk(σ, s)) be a vector in the
simplex ∆K satisfying (A.1) and (A.2) for all s ∈ S.
Let ρ > 0 be a number such that R∗k(s) > ρ, s ∈ S (see (13)). Denote
by ∆K(ρ) the set of those vectors (b1, ..., bK) in ∆
K that satisfy bk ≥ ρ,
k = 1, ..., K. Consider the function
Φ(s, κ, µ) =
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s) ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(σ, s)
R∗k(s)
R∗k(s)κ+ (1− κ)µk
−
∑
σ∈S
p(σ|s) ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(σ, s)
µk
R∗k(s)κ+ (1− κ)µk
of s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K(ρ).
Lemma 1 There exists a constant Lρ and a function δρ(γ) ≥ 0 of γ ∈ [0,∞)
satisfying the following conditions:
(a) The function δ(·) is non-decreasing, and δρ(γ) > 0 for all γ > 0.
(b) For any s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K(ρ), we have
Lρ|R∗(s)− µ| ≥ Φ(s, κ, µ) ≥ δρ(|R∗(s)− µ|). (38)
Proof. It follows from (Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ 2002, Lemma
3.1) that, for all s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and any µ ∈ ∆K+ , µ 6= R∗(s), the value of
Φ(s, κ, µ) is strictly positive. Fix some γ0 > 0 for which the set W (s, γ) =
{µ ∈ ∆Kρ : |R∗(s)− µ| ≥ γ} is non-empty for all s ∈ S, γ ∈ [0, γ0] and define
δρ(s, γ) = inf{Φ(s, κ, µ) : κ ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ W (s, γ)}
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if γ ∈ [0, γ0] and δρ(s, γ) = δρ(s, γ0) if γ > γ0. Since Φ(s, κ, µ) is continuous
and strictly positive on the compact set [0, 1]×W (s, γ) (γ > 0), the function
δρ(s, γ) takes on strictly positive values for γ > 0. Clearly this function
is non-decreasing in γ. Fix some s, consider any µ ∈ ∆Kρ and define γ =
|R∗(s)− µ|. Then we have µ ∈ W (s, γ), and so
Φ(s, κ, µ) ≥ δρ(s, γ) = δρ(s, |R∗(s)− µ|).
From this we can see that the sought-for function δρ(γ) can be defined as
δρ(γ) = min
s∈S
δρ(s, γ).
We can write Φ(s, κ, µ) = Φ(s, κ, µ)−Φ(s, κ,R∗k(s)) since the latter term
is zero. The function Φ(s, κ, µ) is differentiable in µ ∈ ∆K+ and its gradient
Φ′µ(s, ·, ·) is continuous, and hence bounded, on the compact set [0, 1]×∆Kρ .
This implies the existence of the Lipschitz constant Lρ in (38). 
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